

## Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

/026 W

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P 151950Z OCT 74

FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2349

AMEMBASSY PRIORITY

USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 0112

EXDIS/SALT

DEPT ALSO PASS DOD

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E.O. 11652: XGDS1

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 15, 1974  
(SALT TWO-469)

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY DEPUTY  
MINISTER SEMENOV AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF OCTOBER 15, 1974.

QUOTE

SEMENOV STATEMENT, OCTOBER 15, 1974

TODAY WE INTEND TO ADDRESS A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS WHOSE  
CONSIDERATION APPEARS IMPORTANT IN TERMS OF ACCOMPLISHING  
THE TASK SET BY THE UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE  
U.S. OF JULY 3, 1974 -- TO WORK OUT A NEW AGREEMENT WITH A  
DURATION UNTIL 1985.

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IN THE COURSE OF THE CURRENT PHASE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS,

THE SSR DELEGATION HAS EXPRESSED CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE EXERCISE OF RESTRAINT BY THE SIDES IN THE FURTHER DEPLOYMENT OF THEIR STRATEGIC ARMAMENTS. THE SOVIET SIDE ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THIS PROBLEM AND BELIEVES THAT ITS POSITIVE RESOLUTION WOULD BE IMPORTANT FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE NEW AGREEMENT FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL 1985.

ASSUMPTION BY THE SIDES OF SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT IN THE DEPLOYMENT OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY MAKE THE NEW AGREEMENT MORE EFFECTIVE AND INCREASE ITS SIGNIFICANCE. IT WOULD ALSO HELP TO CREATE MORE FAVORABLE CONDITIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION BY THE SIDES OF FURTHER STEPS IN LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH OBLIGATIONS WOULD ALSO HAVE A BROADER IMPORTANCE -- IN TERMS OF A POSITIVE INFLUENCE ON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AS A WHOLE, AMONG OTHER THINGS AS AN EXAMPLE THAT OTHER STATES COULD FOLLOW.

BASED ON SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING THE SOVIET SIDE BELIEVES IT DESIRABLE TO DISCUSS THE ASSUMPTION OF OBLIGATIONS BY THE SIDES TO EXERCISE MAXIMUM RESTRAINT IN THE FURTHER DEPLOYMENT OF STRATEGIC ARMS. IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS PROPOSAL WOULD BE IN THE INTERESTS OF BOTH OUR STATES AND WOULD BE IN ACCORD WITH THE INTERESTS OF ALL THE OTHER PEOPLES OF THE WORLD, AS WELL.

THE PROBLEM OF RESTRAINT HAS ALREADY BEEN TOUCHED UPON IN THE COURSE OF THE SOVIET-AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. THE USSR DELEGATION BELIEVES IT IMPORTANT TO DISCUSS THIS QUESTION FURTHER WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF FINDING A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION WITH RESPECT TO THE TASKS NOW BEFORE THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS.

## II

THE USSR DELEGATION PROCEEDS FROM THE PREMISE THAT AN UNDERSTANDING ON THE EXERCISE OF RESTRAINT WILL FIND SPECIFIC EMBODIMENT IN APPROPRIATE MEASURES.

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THE SOVIET SIDE HAS CAREFULLY STUDIED THE CONSIDERATIONS EXPRESSED BY THE DELEGATIONS IN THE COURSE OF MANY PHASES OF THE SOVIET-AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS ON THE LIMITATIONS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS ON THE QUESTION OF RESTRAINT. THIS STUDY REINFORCES OUR CONVICTION THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF RESTRAINT CAN AND MUST BE REFLECTED IN THE PROVISIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT AND THAT THERE ARE A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC

QUESTIONS WHICH COULD BE CONSIDERED BY THE DELEGATIONS IN THIS REGARD. ONE SUCH QUESTION IS LIMITING, FOR THE DURATION OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, THE MAKING OPERATIONAL OF NEW GENERATION NUCLEAR-POWERED BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES WHICH MIGHT BE DEVELOPED IN THE FUTURE. ASSUMPTION BY THE SIDES OF A CORRESPONDING OBLIGATION WOULD CONSTITUTE A GENUINE EMBODIMENT IN THE NEW AGREEMENT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF RESTRAINT AND WOULD BE A MEANINGFUL STEP IN LIMITING THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS RACE.

ANOTHER SIGNIFICANT ISSUE IS LIMITING THE MAKING OPERATIONAL OF NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC BOMBERS. THIS STEP COULD ALSO BE A MEANINGFUL POSITIVE FACTOR RESTRAINING THE BUILD-UP OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, IN SUCH AN IMPORTANT TYPE OF THESE ARMS AS STRATEGIC BOMBERS. SUCH AN OBLIGATION WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY ENHANCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE LIMITATIONS WHICH CAN BE AGREED UPON BY THE SIDES WITH RESPECT TO THIS TYPE OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPON.

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE GREAT POSITIVE SIGNIFICANCE THAT A POSSIBLE UNDERSTANDING ON THESE QUESTIONS WOULD HAVE FOR THE STANDPOINT OF ACCOMPLISHING THE TASK SPECIFIED IN THE USSR-US UNDERSTANDING OF JULY 3, 1974, THE SOVIET SIDE PROPOSES THAT AN OBLIGATION BE ASSUMED LIMITING, FOR THE DURATION OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, THE MAKING OPERATIONAL OF NEW GENERATION NUCLEAR-POWERED BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES AND NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC BOMBERS. WE HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO EXPLAIN THAT THIS REFERS TO U.S. TRIDENT TYPE SUBMARINES WITH 20-24 BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHERS ABOARD AND B-1 TYPE STRATEGIC BOMBERS, AND TO ANALOGOUS SYSTEMS OF THE SOVIET UNION. THUS, AND WE WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THIS, THE OBLIGATION OF THE SIDES WOULD BE OF A RECIPROCAL NATURE, IT WOULD BE MUTUAL.

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IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS PROPOSAL, WITH RESPECT TO A NEW AGREEMENT WITH A DURATION UNTIL 1985, WOULD SERVE AS A CONCRETE EXAMPLE OF RESTRAINT WHICH, WE ARE FIRMLY CONVINCED, WOULD BE IN THE INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES.

THE PROPOSAL OF THE SOVIET SIDE, SUBMITTED BY THE USSR DELEGATION TODAY, IS REALISTIC IN NATURE AND IS FULLY IN ACCORD WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE. ITS IMPLEMENTATION, IN CONNECTION WITH THE NEW AGREEMENT FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL 1985, WOULD APPEAR TO BE A TIMELY MEASURE. ACHIEVEMENT OF A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE UNDERSTANDING ON THIS QUESTION IS, IN FACT, A FEASIBLE TASK.

THE USSR DELEGATION IS CONVINCED THAT THIS PROPOSAL OF THE SOVIET SIDE PRESENTS A GOOD OPPORTUNITY FOR FINDING A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION. THEREBY, A SIGNIFICANT STEP WOULD BE MADE TOWARD ACHIEVING THE OBJECTIVE SET FOR THE DELEGATIONS BY THE UNDERSTANDING, AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL, OF JULY 3, 1974.

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

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P 151950Z OCT 74

FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2350

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 0112

EXDIS/SALT

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III

BANNING NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WOULD ALSO CONSTITUTE A MEANINGFUL STEP IN ACCOMPLISHING THE TASK SET BY THE UNDERSTANDING OF JULY 3, 1974. IN THE COURSE OF THE CURRENT PHASE THE USSR DELEGATION SUBMITTED A CORRESPONDING PROPOSAL ON THIS SCORE.

THE UNDERSTANDING PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD COVER A WIDE RANGE OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. A LARGE AND SUBSTANTIAL GROUP OF SYSTEMS WOULD THEREBY BE REMOVED FROM THE COMPETITION IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

ONE OF THE IMPORTANT MEASURES WE LISTED IS BANNING  
FIXED AND MOBILE BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHERS WHICH COULD BE  
EMPLACED ON THE SEABED AND OCEAN FLOOR OR IN THE SUBSOIL  
THEREOF, INCLUDING THE TERRITORIAL SEA AND INLAND  
WATERS.

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A CORRESPONDING UNDERTAKING BY THE SIDES WOULD CONTRIBUTE  
TO A LIMITING THE SPHERES OF DEPLOYMENT FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE  
ARMS. IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE OTHER PROPOSALS ADVANCED  
BY THE SOVIET SIDE, THIS MEASURE WOULD LEAD TO GUARANTEEING  
THE NEW AGREEMENT AGAINST CIRCUMVENTION THROUGH A BUILD-UP  
IN THE NUMBER OF LAUNCHERS FOR MISSILES WITH NUCLEAR WARHEADS,  
CAPABLE OF REACHING THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE. THIS,  
IT SEEMS TO US, WOULD BE IN ACCORD WITH THE INTERESTS OF  
BOTH SIDES.

AT THE SAME TIME, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MEASURE  
WOULD ALSO HAVE A WIDER SIGNIFICANCE. AS YOU KNOW, THE  
USSR AND THE U.S., BEING PARTIES TO THE 1971 TREATY ON THE  
PROHIBITION OF THE EMBLACEMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND OTHER  
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ON THE SEABED AND THE OCEAN  
FLOOR AND IN THE SUBSOIL THEREOF, HAVE THE OBLIGATION NOT  
TO EMBLACE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON THE SEABED AND OCEAN FLOOR  
BEYOND THE LIMITS OF THE ZONE DEFINED IN THE TREATY. THIS  
TREATY ALSO PROVIDES FOR AN UNDERTAKING TO CONTINUE NEGOTIA-  
TIONS IN GOOD FAITH CONCERNING FURTHER MEASURES IN THE  
FIELD OF DISARMAMENT FOR THE PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE ON  
THE SEABED, THE OCEAN FLOOR AND THE SUBSOIL THEREOF.

ASSUMPTION BY THE SIDES OF THE OBLIGATION NOT TO  
DEVELOP, TEST OR DEPLOY FIXED OR MOBILE BALLISTIC MISSILE  
LAUNCHERS WHICH COULD BE EMBLACED ON THE SEABED AND OCEAN  
FLOOR OR IN THE SUBSOIL THEREOF, INCLUDING THE TERRITORIAL  
SEA AND INLAND WATERS, WOULD THIS UNDOUBTEDLY BE OF GREAT  
IMPORTANCE BOTH IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS  
ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, AND IN TERMS  
OF STRENGTHENING THE AFOREMENTIONED MULTILATERAL TREATY,  
WHICH WAS WORKED OUT WITH THE ACTIVE PARTICIPATION OF THE  
USSR AND THE U.S.

I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE ONCE AGAIN THAT OBLIGATIONS  
TO BAN NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WOULD, OF  
COURSE, BE MUTUAL AND WOULD APPLY TO BOTH THE U.S. AND  
THE SOVIET UNION. IN VIEW OF THE GREAT IMPORTANCE OF THESE  
PROHIBITIONS, THE USSR DELEGATION INTENDS TO PRESENT A  
NUMBER OF ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS ON THEM LATER.

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IV

MR. AMBASSADOR,

THE USSR AND U.S. DELEGATIONS HAVE THE TASK OF DISCUSS-  
ING GENERAL CONCEPTS RELATED TO WORKING OUT A NEW AGREEMENT  
ON LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WITH A DURATION UNTIL  
1985, BEING GUIDED BY THE UNDERSTANDING ON THAT SCORE,  
WHICH WAS REACHED IN THE COURSE OF THE SOVIET-AMERICAN  
SUMMIT MEETING OF 1974.

IN LIGHT OF THIS TASK IT SEEMS IMPORTANT TO US THAT THE  
DELEGATIONS, PURPOSEFULLY AND WITHOUT LOSING TIME, THOROUGHLY  
DISCUSS THE RANGE OF QUESTIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS RELATED  
TO THE AGREEMENT BEING PREPARED, WITH A VIEW TO EXPLORING  
AND IDENTIFYING EVERY POSSIBILITY.

PROCEEDING FROM THIS PREMISE, THE USSR DELEGATION  
INTENDS TO CONTINUE SETTING FORTH ITS APPROACH TO THE QUES-  
TIONS BEING CONSIDERED AT THE NEGOTIATIONS, INTENDING TO  
ADDRESS A NUMBER OF ASPECTS AND ALSO PRESENT ITS VIEWS ON  
THOSE CONSIDERATIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED BY THE U.S.  
DELEGATION HERE; WE EXPECT TO HEAR ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS  
AND CLARIFICATIONS FROM THE U.S. DELEGATION, AS WELL

UNQUOTE

JOHNSON

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## Message Attributes

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